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BOOK REVIEW

UNDER THE EMPIRICAL RADAR: AN INITIAL
EXPRESSIVE LAW ANALYSIS OF THE ADA
Michael Ashley Stein*
Rights of Inclusion: Law and Identity in the Life Stories of
Americans with Disabilities. By David M. Engel & Frank W.
Munger. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 2003.
INTRODUCTION

UWJHILE enacting the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA"),1 Senators Harkin and Kennedy each proclaimedits
passage as an "emancipationproclamation"for people with disabilities.2Fourteen years later,3one wonders just how much (if at all) the
disabled have been emancipated.4

* Associate Professor,William & Mary School of Law; Visiting Scholar,Harvard
Law School (2004);VisitingFellow, HarvardHumanRights Program(2004). I thank
Peter Blanck,Dennis Callahan,and Alex Geisingerfor their comments;SarahBlack
and law librarianFred Dingledy for their superlativeassistance;and Penelope Stein
for inspiringbelief in the power of transformation.My researchwas funded by an
AmericanCounselof LearnedSocietiesAndrewW. MellonFellowship.
42 U.S.C. ?? 12101-12213(2000).The focus of this Reviewis the employmentsubchapter(TitleI) of the ADA. 42 U.S.C.?? 12111-12117.
2136 Cong. Rec. 17,369 (1990) (statementof Sen. Harkin);135 Cong. Rec. 19,888
(1989)(statementof Sen.Kennedy).
3Twelve years later, if one counts from the time the statute's equal employment
provisionsbecame operativeon July26, 1992.See Americanswith DisabilitiesAct of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336,? 108, 104 Stat. 327, 337 (1990). The provisionshave applied to certain employers for only ten years. See id. ? 101(5)(A), 104 Stat. at 330
(providingthat Title I applyto employersof more than twenty-fiveworkersuntil July
26,4 1994,thence to workplaceswith more than fifteen employees).
ventureda preliminaryconsiderationof the questionof disabilityemploymentas
a measureof the ADA's efficacyseven yearsago in MichaelAshley Stein, Employing
People with Disabilities:Some CautionaryThoughtsfor a Second GenerationCivil
Rights Statute, Speech at the Universityof Iowa (1997), in Employment,Disability,
and the Americanswith DisabilitiesAct: Issues in Law, PublicPolicy, and Research
51 (Peter David Blancked., 2000).
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One way to gauge whether social and economic empowerment
has increased for people with disabilities after the ADA's passage
is to examine their employment experiences.5 To date, empirical
studies of post-ADA disabled employees' labor market participation are less than encouraging.6Notably, two well-publicized empirical studies of the relative post-ADA employment effects on
workers with disabilities found an overall reduction in the employment rate, concurrent with a neutral effect on wages.7 These
studies have sparked a growing debate among scholars who either

5

As stated eloquently by Professor Vicki Schultz:
Our historical conception of citizenship, our sense of community, and our sense
that we are of value to the world all depend importantly on the work we do for
a living and how it is organized and understood by the larger society. In everyday language, we are what we do for a living.
Vicki Schultz, Life's Work, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1881, 1884 (2000). For additional,
complementary views on the connection between work, citizenship, and self-worth
see Judith N. Shklar, American Citizenship: The Quest for Inclusion 63-101 (1991)
(exploring the connection between work and citizenship in a democracy); Cynthia L.
Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law, 89 Geo. L.J.
1, 2-4 (2000) (arguing for the workplace as a "vehicle of civic engagement"); Gregory
S. Kavka, Disability and the Right to Work, 9 Soc. Phil. & Pol'y 262, 263-64 (1992)
(arguing for a moral and legal right to work for disabled citizens).
6
One commentator has characterized the "statute's impact," with tongue firmly in
cheek, as being "anything but radical." See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans
with Disabilities Act as Welfare Reform, 44 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 921, 923 (2003).
7 See Daron
Acemoglu & Joshua D. Angrist, Consequences of Employment Protection? The Case of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 109 J. Pol. Econ. 915, 929-33
(2001); Thomas DeLeire, The Wage and Employment Effects of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 35 J. Hum. Resources 691, 700-08 (2000). Professor DeLeire utilized
data panels of men aged eighteen to sixty-four from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) from 1986-1993. Id. at 697-98. He concluded that after the
ADA's passage, the average employment level of men with disabilities decreased
7.2% relative to that of men without disabilities. Id. at 705. Over the same period,
DeLeire did not discern a change in disabled workers' relative earnings. Id. Professors
Acemoglu and Angrist culled their results from the 1988-1997 Current Population
Survey (CPS) data for both men and women age twenty-one to fifty-eight. Acemoglu
& Angrist, supra, at 916-17. These results generally corroborate DeLeire's findings,
but in greater detail. Acemoglu and Angrist found that, for the twenty-one to thirtynine age group, the relative employment level of disabled workers declined by ten to
fifteen percent with respect to the number of weekly hours worked. Id. at 930-32.
Across the forty to fifty-eight age group, Acemoglu and Angrist did not discover a
relative effect upon women with disabilities. Id. The employment level for men with
disabilities, however, did decrease significantly. Id. The overall relative wage level of
workers with disabilities was unchanged. Id.
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support8 or challenge9 their findings. Nonetheless, even those
economists seeking to explain the available data within the context
of broader economic effects10concede that post-ADA disabilityrelated employment (broadly defined) has not dramatically improved.11At the same time, plaintiffs asserting ADA Title I employment discrimination claims in the federal courts have a lower
win-loss rate than any other group excepting prisoner-rights litigants.12Specifically, an American Bar Association report found
that employers prevailed in about ninety-two percent of Title I
cases between 1992 and 1997.13Although a number of factors may

8For example, Professor ChristineJolls identifies the circumstancesunder which
accommodationmandatesare likely to reduce a given group'semploymentlevel or
wages. See ChristineJolls, AccommodationMandates,53 Stan. L. Rev. 223 (2000).
She posits that in the case of workerswith disabilities,restrictionson employmentdifferentialsare unlikelyto be binding,while restrictionson wage differentialsare likely
to be binding. Id. at 274-75. Consequently,Jolls's model predicts that the relative
post-ADA wages of disabledworkerswill increase or remain unchanged,while the
employmentrate will continueto decrease.Id. at 275.
9See, e.g., Susan Schwochau& Peter David Blanck,The Economicsof the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, PartIII: Does the ADA Disable the Disabled?,21 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 271, 293-312 (2000) (presentingdetailed econometricobjections to the two post-ADA employmentstudies). For an updated version of their
critique, see Susan Schwochau& Peter Blanck, Does the ADA Disable the Disabled?-More Comments,42 Indus.Rel. 67 (2003).
10For the most currentdetailed treatmentsof this
subject,see The Decline in Employmentof People with Disabilities:A Policy Puzzle (David C. Stapleton& Richard
V. Burkhausereds., 2003);Symposium,Disabilityand Employment,42 Indus. Rel. 1
(2003).
11
See, e.g., RichardV. Burkhauser& David C. Stapleton,A Review of the Evidence and Its Implicationsfor Policy Change,in The Decline in Employmentof People with Disabilities:A PolicyPuzzle,supranote 10, at 369, 373 (reportingthat all the
authorsagree that "[t]heemploymentrate for working-agedadults with disabilities,
broadly defined, has declined duringthe 1990s, both absolutelyand relative to the
rate for those withoutdisabilities").
12 See Theodore Eisenberg,LitigationModels and Trial Outcomes in Civil Rights
and PrisonerCases,77 Geo. L.J. 1567, 1578 (1989) (settingforth data establishingthe
low successrate of prisonerplaintiffsin civil rightslitigation).
13Am. Bar Ass'n, Study Finds EmployersWin Most ADA Title I Judicialand AdministrativeComplaints,22 Mental & PhysicalDisabilityL. Rep. 403, 403 (1998). A
subsequentstudy found that employerswon at a rate of approximatelyninety-three
percent. Ruth Colker, The Americanswith DisabilitiesAct: A Windfallfor Defendants, 34 Harv. C.R.-C.L.L. Rev. 99, 108-09 (1999). ProfessorColker argues that
plaintiffsfrequentlylose underthe ADA because "[c]ourtsare abusingthe summary
judgmentdevice" by "refusingto send normativefactual questions"to juries. Id. at
101.
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contribute to this phenomenon,14 the overall impression is dire.
Thus, from a purely quantitativeperspective,empiricalanalysisindicates that the ADA is not fulfillingits promise of empoweringworkers with disabilities.
By contrast,ProfessorsDavid Engel and Frank Munger'sthoughtful book, Rights of Inclusion: Law and Identity in the Life Stories of
Americans with Disabilities,1 applies a noneconomic metric to the
question of whether the ADA is "working,"and in so doing provides
an alternative appraisalof the statute'sefficacy.16
Utilizing qualitative
analysis, Engel and Munger interviewed workers with disabilities
who had never asserted disability-relatedemployment discrimination
claims.17They conclude that the ADA's mere presence has changed
disabled persons' identities by creating a vision of work-capable
people who can be successful and vibrant employees if given the
opportunity, including proper accommodations, to demonstrate
these abilities. At the same time, Engel and Munger argue that the
putative employment rights embodied in the ADA can only be
14 These can include:technicalmisuse of
pretrialmotions in favorof defendants;judicialoppositionto the statuteor indifferencetowardspeople with disabilities;claimants not fallingwithinthe statute'spurview;plaintiffsfeeling stronglyenough to pursue nonwinning claims or having negative expectation value of settlement;
informationalasymmetrycloudingthe litigationdecisionmakingprocess;poor lawyering; or mediocreexpert testimony.See MichaelAshley Stein, The Law and Economics of DisabilityAccommodations,53 Duke L.J.79, 86, 90-96 (2003).
"5David M. Engel & FrankW.
Munger,Rightsof Inclusion:Law and Identityin the
Life Storiesof Americanswith Disabilities(2003).
16 This
point has been previouslynoted: "Exploringalternativemeasuresby which
to gauge Title I's success can also enhance our understandingof the post-ADA employment experiencesof workerswith disabilities."MichaelAshley Stein, Empirical
Implicationsof TitleI, 85 IowaL. Rev.1671,1687(2000).
' An initialnote on methodologyis warranted.The authorsconducted180 preliminarytelephoneinterviewsfromwhichthey selected sixtyfor full follow-upinterviews.
From that group,eight people were chosen for "repeatinterviews,"an unusualtechnique in whichthe subjectswere allowedto reviewwhat had been writtenabout them
and amendany errors.Six elected to do so. See Engel & Munger,supranote 15, at 79. A scholargiven to empiricalresearchcould criticizethe authors'methodologyas
being vulnerableto selection bias, meaningthat they invited back people who could
provide them with informationthey desired (just as a scholar using qualitativeresearchmight argue that the empiricalmethod is subjectto bias in developingits underlyingassumptions).Whatis, however,somewhattroublingis that the initialcohort,
while divided between individualswith physical disabilities(wheelchairusers) and
those with variouslearningdisabilities,was culled from a narrowgeographicregion
(western New York) and thus might have a somewhat limited perspectivedue to
hegemonicculturalinput.Id. at 7-8.
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brought to fruition if people with disabilities understand and embrace the statute's normative aspirations.18Their assessment of the
ADA as well as their subsequent proposal for a "new theory" of
rights that can properly encompass the dynamics of disability identity formation are therefore both internal and contextual to those
individuals whose life stories are presented in Rights of Inclusion.
This Review seeks to bridge the inquiries made by the two normally exclusive disciplines of economics (the external, quantitative
empirical radar) and sociology (the internal, qualitative assessment
of rights discourse),'9by presenting a third path: an initial expressive law analysis of the ADA (examining the phenomena that exist
beneath the empirical radar).20That approach considers how the
external (law) can influence the internal (individual behavior) by
altering broader social norms, an aspect of rights theory and
change that is not addressed in Rights of Inclusion.21 In considering
those precepts, I am particularly interested in building on the expressive law gloss presented in Professor Alex Geisinger's "belief
change" theory, which identifies and models a process through
which regulations can affect norms and preferences.22
18

Id. at 251.

19The metaphorof bridge buildingin this context, as well as the characterization
that the disciplinesexist at opposite poles, is drawnfrom the whimsicalIan Ayres,
Never ConfuseEfficiencywith a LiverComplaint,1997Wis. L. Rev. 503, 506-07 (noting that among "those economiststhat do from time-to-timeengage sociology,there
are those who are Bridge-builders/Appeasers
and those who are Openly Hostile").
With the exceptionof technicalphrasesand words of art, I have attemptedthroughout this Review to "translate"discipline-specificlanguageinto more readilyaccessible
terms.
20My hope is that, as the firstpublicationon this topic, this Review will be construed
as an invitationto a continuingdialogue.
21 See infra Section II.A.
Ironically,inquiriesinto the effect that law can have on
social
norms
and
were formallythe intellectualprovinceof law and
behavior
molding
society scholars,includingthe authorsof Rightsof Inclusion.See, e.g., FrankMunger,
Minersand lawyers:law practiceand class conflictin Appalachia,1872-1920,in Lawyers in a postmodern world: translationand transgression185 (Maureen Cain &
ChristineB. Harringtoneds., 1994);David M. Engel, The Oven Bird'sSong:Insiders,
Outsidersand Personal Injuriesin an American Community,18 Law & Soc'y Rev.
551 (1984). At the same time, it bears noting that neitherRightsof Inclusionnor expressive law scholarship(including,for the most part, this Review) adequatelyaccount for exogenousfactors(for example,publictransportationand health care) that
have a powerfuleffect on the efficacyof antidiscrimination
norms.
22 Alex
Geisinger,A Belief ChangeTheory of ExpressiveLaw, 88 Iowa L. Rev. 35
(2002).This Review owes a large debt both to Geisinger'swork and to his friendship.
For an adumbrationof his belief changetheory,see infraSectionII.B.
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Part I will set forth the disability life stories chronicled by Engel
and Munger and the conclusions they draw from those experiences
about the nature of identity and rights theory. Next, Part II will describe the general goals of expressive law scholarship and will outline Geisinger's "belief change" theory. Part III will depict existing
socio-legal norms on the disabled, as seen in recent United States
Supreme Court decisions, and the aspirations contained in the
ADA. Part IV will then set forth a preliminary expressive law
analysis of the ADA. The Review will conclude by reinterpreting,
from an expressive law perspective, some of the disability life stories portrayed in Rights of Inclusion.
I. A QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS: DISABILITY LIFE STORIES

The central thesis of Rights of Inclusion is that disability-related
rights become active in formal (that is, legal) and informal (meaning nonlegal) settings. Focusing on informal mechanisms, Engel
and Munger conclude that the rights granted to persons with disabilities through the ADA had a powerful effect on many of the interviewees by fostering their self-image as capable and potentially
successful employees. At the same time, the authors maintain that
for the ADA to be effective, disabled employees must be aware of
the nature and scope of their rights and understand that a violation
of those rights has occurred. In consequence, Rights of Inclusion
advocates a rights theory that can appropriatelyaccount for the recursive and internal nature of disability identity that arises through
ADA-inspired rights formation. This Part sets forth Engel and
Munger's conclusions-as presented in the context of their subjects' life stories-about the impact on rights formation of disability identity23and extra-disability factors and their proposal for a
new rights theory.
A. Disability IdentityFormation and its Impact on Rights
Engel and Munger assert that, for the ADA to be effective, disabled employees must be aware of the existence of their rights, and

23 For a similar
approach,see Peter Blanck, Justice for All?: Stories about Americans with Disabilitiesand Their Civil Rights, 8 J. Gender Race & Just. (forthcoming
2004).
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of a subsequent rights violation.24Such awareness is dependent on
an individual's identity, the formation of which results from his or
her interactive process with society at large.2 Because persons with
disabilities are vulnerable to societal prejudice, they explain, the
group as a whole is at high risk of internalizinggenerally held negative misperceptions.26As a result, societal pressure can prevent persons with disabilities from having a sense of entitlement to equal
treatment in the workforce and in society as a whole.27To illustrate
this point, Rights of Inclusion examines the lives of both physically
and learning disabled individuals and contrasts their experiences
both within and across disability categories.
According to Engel and Munger, physical limitations are viewed
as disabilities because of a cultural construct that arbitrarilycompares limitations against an arbitrary norm.2 If persons with dis24Thus,they arguethat "the sense of self determinesthe perceptionsof fairnessand
unfairnessthat precede any considerationof rights."Engel & Munger,supranote 15,
at 16.
25
As the authors put it: "The interactiveprocess of identity formation shapes a
sense of self that is consistentwith either inclusionor exclusionin mainstreamsociety."Id. at 44. The authorsalso turnto the philosopherHabermasfor the proposition
that identityis a result of an interactiveand intersubjectiveprocessbetween self and
society over time. Accordingly,"the basisfor the assertionof one's own identityis not
really self-identification,but intersubjectivelyrecognized self-identification."Id. at
43-44.
26

Id. at 67-69.

27

Id. at 68-69.
The contentionthat disabilityis a social constructand thus the byproductof exogenous environmentalfactorsis a mainstayof the DisabilityStudiesMovement.See,
e.g., Claire H. Liachowitz,Disabilityas a Social Construct:LegislativeRoots (1988)
(tracing the legal, limiting classificationof disability);Richard K. Scotch, Making
Change:The ADA as an Instrumentof SocialReform,in Americanswith Disabilities:
Exploring Implicationsof the Law for Individualsand Institutions275, 275 (Leslie
PickeringFrancis& Anita Silverseds., 2000) (approvingof "a social model of disability that conceptualizesdisabilityas a social constructionthat is the result of interaction between physical or mental impairmentand the social environment");Susan
Wendell, The Rejected Body: Feminist PhilosophicalReflections on Disability 35
(1996) (notingthe difficultyin marking"the distinctionbetween the biologicalreality
of a disabilityand the social constructionof a disability");Ron Amundson,Disability,
Handicap, and the Environment,23 J. Soc. Phil. 105, 110 (1992) (stating that "[a]
handicapresultsfrom the interactionbetween a disabilityand an environment").For
a review of this literatureand its applicationto ADA-based rights,see MichaelAshley Stein, Same Struggle,Different Difference:ADA Accommodationsas Antidiscrimination,153 U. Pa. L. Rev. (forthcomingDecember 2004). For a broadertreatment of the meaningof differencein categorizingpeople and their rights,see Martha
Minow,MakingAll the Difference:Inclusion,Exclusion,and AmericanLaw (1990).
28
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abilities succumb to this vision, their identity is "spoiled,"29and
they view themselves as "disabled" in the sense of feeling powerless. 0 To illustrate this contention, Rights of Inclusion contrasts the
life experiences of two wheelchair users, Sara Lane and Rick
Evans.
Sara Lane is a personally and professionally successful adult because, in large measure, she was able to tell a different story from
the one which society would have imposed on her. Sara sees herself
as a part of the mainstream and therefore views her disability as
one part of her identity and social experience.31She explains that
"because my disability was so integrated into our family as a community... because I was treated as an equal, as a peer, when I
went to get a career, [when] I went to college, those barriers didn't
exist in my mind."32
By comparison, Rick Evans is an example of identity spoiling as
a result of having conflated his self-worth and his disability. Unlike
Sara, Rick has always been separated out from the mainstream.33
During his primary and secondary schooling, his social interactions
throughout life, and his professional experiences, he has lived what
the authors term a "marginalizedidentity."34Rick blames his lack
of personal and professional success on his disability and the failure of the ADA. He therefore feels powerless to be anything other
than a victim of prejudice and circumstance.5
Unlike a majority of physical disabilities, many learning disabilities are neither readily visible nor well recognized,36and so their va29The term references the seminal work by Erving Goffman. Erving Goffman,
Stigma:Notes on the Managementof SpoiledIdentity(1963).
Engel & Munger,supranote 15, at 46.
31Id.at 54.

2Id. at 22.
3Id.at 56.
4Id. at 42.
35Id. at 56-57.
36
This raises an interesting,but parentheticalissue. Pursuantto Title I, employers
cannot,with certainexceptions,inquireinto the history,existence,or extent of a person's disability.42 U.S.C. ? 12112(d)(4)(A) (2000);see Chai Feldblum,Medical Examinationsand InquiriesUnder the Americanswith DisabilitiesAct: A View From
the Inside,64 Temp. L. Rev. 521, 531 (1991) (analyzingthe medicalexaminationsand
inquiriessection of the employmenttitle of the ADA using legislativehistory).Conversely,when a person has a disabilitythat is not readilyascertainableand does not
disclose to her employerthe existence of her disability,she will not be protectedunder the ADA's auspices.Id. Similarly,underTitle VII of the CivilRightsAct of 1964,
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lidity is often questioned.37Consequently, Engel and Munger maintain there is a strong temptation to "pass" as a person without a
disability to avoid social stigma and subordination.38Vicki Kennedy, for example, has never been formally diagnosed with a learning disability and resists diagnosis. The absence of physical symptoms makes her question the reality of her disability.39Thus, Vicki
does not consider asserting her disability-based rights, including

if a person'sreligiousconvictionspreventher from performingher employment,she
is not protectedunless she had previouslydisclosedthat limitation.See, e.g., Johnson
v. Angelica Unif. Group, 762 F.2d 671, 673 (8th Cir. 1985) (denyingrecourseto an
employee who was terminatedfor missingwork on religiousholidaysbecauseshe had
not informedher employerof the holidays).Thus, for purposesof attemptingto enculturatewithin a firm and avoid prejudice,when should a person with a nonvisible
disabilitydisclosethat disability?This is an especiallypertinentquestionif the disability in question is a cognitive disabilitythat is likely, as demonstratedby the sources
cited in note 37, infra, to encounter strong prejudice.Rights of Inclusion briefly
touches on this issue by presentingthe life story of Jim Vargas,a physicaltherapist
with a learningdisability.See Engel & Munger,supranote 15, at 126-30. Jim's impairmentaffects his job performancein that he has great difficultykeeping up with
the paperwork,thoughhe stayslate and worksthroughlunch.Frustrated,he changes
jobs often. Id. at 126-27. Jim's dilemmais whetherto conceal or reveal his learning
disabilityto employersat interviews.He has resolvedto take an ad hoc approach,as
revealinghis disabilitycan either hurt him (in that he might be met "withdisbelief
rather than understanding")or help him (in that he becomes legally eligible for accommodationand so employerscannotmisinterpretthe effects of his disabilityon job
Id. at 127.
performance).
37
This point is made by a numberof commentators,most notablySusanStefan.For
her perspective on external stigma and subordination,see Susan Stefan, Hollow
Promises:EmploymentDiscriminationAgainst People with Mental Disabilities xivxv (2002);SusanStefan,Unequal Rights:DiscriminationAgainst People with Mental
Disabilitiesand the Americanswith DisabilitiesAct (2001). For her thoughtson the
issue of stigma and identificationwithin the disabilitycommunity,see Susan Stefan,
"Discredited"and "Discreditable":The Searchfor PoliticalIdentity by People with
PsychiatricDiagnoses,44 Wm. & MaryL. Rev. 1341(2003).
8Traditionally,the term "passing"has referredto people of color who subsume
their racial identities in order to live among the mainstreamas majoritymembers.
See, e.g., Brooke Kroeger,Passing:When People Can't Be Who They Are (2003);
James M. O'Toole, Passingfor White: Race, Religion, and the Healy Family, 18201920 (2002). At times the phenomenonof passingcan also be involuntary,resulting
from an individual'slack of knowledgeregardinghis familyhistory.See, e.g., Gregory
HowardWilliams,Life on the Color Line:The True Story of a White Boy Who Discovered He Was Black (1995) (recountingthe experiencesof a former law school
dean). Recently, the notion of passing has been applied to other groups. See, e.g.,
Passing:Identity and Interpretationin Sexuality,Race, and Religion (Maria Carla
Sanchez& LindaSchlossbergeds., 2001).
39
Engel & Munger,supranote 15, at 61-62.
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those contained in the ADA.4 Similarly, William Heinz was formally diagnosed as dyslexic and had a terrible experience in the
special education system. Because he believes that his diagnosis focused societal prejudices and misconceptions against him more
strongly, William hides his learning disability from others.41Like
Vicki, William does not consider asserting rights related to his disability under the ADA.4
Conversely, Jill Golding's diagnosis with a learning disability as
an adult was a powerfully transformative experience that allowed
her to claim a place in the mainstream as a successful nurse. From
a childhood when she and others viewed her as stupid, lazy, and
undeserving of the mainstream, she has been able to access her
abilities and talents and transform her sense of self in the process.
This was because, after her diagnosis, Jill was able to forge a new
identity, one in which she is capable, successful, and deserving of
the mainstream.43Knowing that she has legal rights under the
ADA has allowed Jill to find the strength to assert those rights informally, to personal and professional advantage."
B. Extra-DisabilityFactorsAffecting Rights
Engel and Munger identify social class, family, race, and gender45
as extra-disability factors affecting the development of disability
identity and its interplay with ADA rights.46How an individual
with a disability conceives of her opportunities and rights under the
ADA, if she conceives of them at all, is linked to these contextual
factors. Crucial to the overall ability of disabled employees to
work, according to Rights of Inclusion, are the resources available

40Id.

41

at 66.

Id. at 62-65.

42Id. at 66.
43 In this
respect, Jill's circumstance is a rarity. The authors note that few of the
learning disabled people they interviewed "viewed their situation through such a
rights-tinged lens. Jill's perspective is distinctive because it equates learning disabilities with physical disabilities ... and with the issue of racial discrimination." Id. at 34.
44Id. at 30-36.
45
The authors, and hence this Review, use the term "gender" to refer to assigned
social roles that cut across people's "sex," meaning their biological difference. Id. at
214.
46
Id. at 18-19.
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to them at the point their careers first intersect with their disabilities.47
The authors contend that social class affects identity formation
in that the options a person believes are available, as well as the future he perceives as possible, are frequently dictated by social
strata. As the child of uneducated Polish immigrants, Rosemary
Sauter was expected to enter the workforce rather than attend college and did so.48There was no conception of learning disabilities in
Rosemary's world, and she was thought by her family, teachers,
and peers to be slothful and unintelligent.49By contrast, Barry
Swygert was raised in a supportive and middle-class home environment, and it was assumed that he would continue to be professionally successful after the onset of his disability at the age of
thirty. He and his social circle are aware of his rights and he has
utilized government programs geared at helping persons with disabilities to participate in the workplace.50
One's family situation, according to Engel and Munger, also affects identity formation. No one in Louise Dobbs's alcoholic, abusive, and dysfunctional family, including Louise, ever saw a future
for her beyond manual labor and poverty. She has no notion of legal empowerment or assistance of any kind and believes that the
paralysis she sustained following a stroke prevents her from ever
returning to her old job in a chicken factory.5'Until dyslexic William Thomas was transferred into a stable and supportive foster
home, he did very poorly in school, despite receiving special education services.52His strong mentoring relationship with a local locksmith with whom he apprenticed taught William "how to be a man,
how to carry [him]self, how to carry adversity."53
Nevertheless, William's status as an impoverished AfricanAmerican has limited his ambition. Although he will attend a junior college, he has no conception that the ADA and the rights he
holds under it could expand his career options beyond becoming a
47See
id. at 168-238.
48 generally
Rosemaryworkedas a dance teacheroriginally,but she now works as an operating room nurse.Id. at 172, 175.
9Id. at 168-74.
50
Id. at 100-03.
Id. at 180-83.

51
52

Id. at 184-86.

53Id.

at 186.
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locksmith.54Contrast William with Evelyn Gardner, the child of an
upwardly mobile working-class African family who was sent to
study in the United States in the fifth grade. While her diagnosis as
dyslexic while attending community college transformed her perspective and her career plans, for Evelyn, race is associated with
cultural differences and her immigrant status, rather than with injustice.55
For Engel and Munger, gender has perhaps the most nuanced effect among extra-disabilityfactors, in that it can impact how rights
become active in four general ways. They found that gender: (1) affects the perceptions individuals have about "themselves as employees"; (2) influences the willingness a person has to assert his or
her rights; (3) negatively interplays with disability so that rights
consciousness is absent from some personal narratives; and (4)
positively interplays with the ADA to help persons with disabilities
reconstructtheir gender identities.56
As an initial premise, Engel and Munger found (as do almost all
feminist legal scholars) that gender roles influence career choices.
While Rosemary Sauter was discouraged from math and mechanical drawing,and was instead expected to marry and raise children,57
Mary Williams found success in the mainstream, in spite of her severe and undiagnosed learning disability, by finding a way to conform to traditional gender roles via cosmetology.58Dick Seaton was
steered toward manual labor as a result of his learning disability
and became a housepainter. Later, as a diagnosed adult, Dick considered returning to school to pursue medicine. He never considered nursing, though, because he perceived of it as womens' work.59
54Id. at 187. Specifically,he does not believe in the reasonable accommodations
provisionin the ADA and thinks that employershave the right not to hire learning
disabledemployeesor providethem with accommodations.As Williamrelatedin his
interview:"You shouldn't discriminatenobody. But if it requiresreading and you
don't know how to do it, you just can't take the job.... Or shouldn'teven applyfor
the job if you know it's reading."Id. He does not use the discourseof racialjustice in
tellinghis story and does not analogizehis learningdisabilityto race. Id. at 189.
55Id. at 190-94.
56
Id. at 236-37. Contrast,for instance,the interplayof racialidentityand disability
for Evelyn: "The discourseof racialjustice appearsto have little to do with the way
she thinksand talksabouther options."Id. at 193.
57 Id. at 171-73.
58

59

Id. at 221-25.
Id. at 219-20.
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Engel and Munger also recount instances of workers with disabilities who exploited their respective gender roles, rather than
utilized their legal rights, to enter the mainstream. Beth Devon's
approach to accommodation issues (albeit pre-ADA) was determined in large part by gender roles and expectations. Instead of
demanding accommodations from her employer, she cajoled him
into providing them. Beth's gender modified her self-reliant attitude in that she took positive advantage of socially expected gender roles, transformingherself into a "girl Friday"to establish herself in the workplace.60Similarly, Sid Tegler approached the
question of accommodation by becoming "one of the guys."
Through stereotypical masculine behavior such as drunken antics
in school and the development of a very "manly" demeanor, Sid
believes he secured his position as an accountant in the mainstream
by emulating his fellow workmen.61
At the opposite end of the spectrum are those who use their disability-grounded rights to reconstruct shattered gender identities.
Jill Golding believes that her employer has a duty under the ADA
to care for her in the same manner that she, as a nurse, cares for
their mutual patients. Jill's legal rights have "positively reinforce[d]
her perception of herself as a nurse and a woman."62In the same
vein, before his disabling injury, Al Vencenzo had asserted his
male identity by playing hockey. Now, as a disabled person cognizant of the ADA, Al asserts his masculinityby prosecuting his legal
rights.63
The authors of Rights of Inclusion conclude that the essential
element in the success of disabled employees participating in the
workplace is the extent of the resources that could be accessed at
the locus of rights and developing disability identities. They assert
that the timing of both disability and the passage of the ADA in an
individual's life cycle impact that individual's identity formation.
To illustrate, after developing a disability at age thirty due to a spi60Id. at 228. Along these lines, Beth believes that personal appearanceis crucial
when looking for (and workingat) a job. She believes that personsusing wheelchairs
should keep them clean and commentsthat "a lot of men don't clean their chairs,"
while she spends "hoursat a time cleaninghers until all the lines [are]sleek" because
chairis partof you, just like yourshoes."Id. at 210.
"[y]our
6
Id. at 227-29.
62Id. at 232.
63

Id. at 234-35.
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nal tumor, Barry Swygert views his post-ADA disability as an important element of his identity, but in a way that is empowering
rather than debilitating.64Sara Lane, who describes herself as a
"type A polio victim," was brought up at a time when people were
"taughtto respond to childhood polio with resilience and to pursue
lofty career goals with high expectations."65Because she was taught
to be self-reliant, Sara is reluctant to formally activate her ADA
rights, although she does feel that the passage of the ADA influenced her identity as one entitled to the mainstream.66Having also
contracted polio as a child, Beth Devon similarly did not feel stigmatized by her disability or "markedas 'different."'67
Nevertheless,
because Beth's work experience as an accountant preceded passage of the ADA, she could not rely on its accommodation provisions and had to persuade her employer to make workplace modifications on her behalf.68
C. A New Rights Theory
As the result of their findings, Engel and Munger proffer a new
rights theory, one they believe is conducive to the ADA's aspirations and influence. In their view, traditional rights theories fail to
adequately interrelate with disability rights.69Moreover, although
the ADA is rarely invoked in a formal manner, it does profoundly
affect individual identity.70Thus, the true measure of the effectiveness of the ADA lies not in how often persons with disabilities assert their legal rights (or prevail in litigation), but in how those
people identify themselves in relation to others.71
Under "classicalrights"theory, rights exist to mitigate the barriers that prevent people from achieving specific purposes and identities-for example, working as a means of being a full citizen.72As
the authors put it:
64 at 100-03.
Id.
65Id. at 196.
66

Id. at 197.

67

Id. at 206.

68

Id. at 207-09.
69 This is because "the
challenges of identity formation differ for persons with physical and learning disabilities." Id. at 16.
70Id. at 80.
71
Id. at 40.
72

See id. at 80-82.

2004]

Under the Empirical Radar

1165

In the classic conception,rights do not merely entitle an individual to do something-vote, attend an integrated school, receive
due process, worship,or marry.They also entitle each individual
to be someone-to be recognized by others as a citizen, as a
member of society, as an autonomous individual within the
Americandemocracy.73
Because barriers exist to the implementation of rights and their
identity-altering effects, the goal of classical rights theory scholars
and legislators is to identify and mitigate these barriers.74
Nevertheless, although classical rights theory has mythic significance in the
minds of the interviewees, Rights of Inclusion asserts that it has little practical import because none of those individuals had formally
invoked their rights through suit.75
According to the "rights versus relationship" model, as individual identity is distributed amongst social relationships, the formal
assertion of rights can damage the relationships that constitute individual identity.76This is because identity is "'distributed'within
social relationships," and thus, "the theorized opposition of rights
and relationships implies significant limitations for the constitutive
effects of the ADA."77Examining rights from this perspective implies that the ADA may increase the exclusion of people with disabilities from the mainstream and harm the identity of people with
disabilities by destroying the personal relationships from which
identity stems.78Moreover, as none of the interviewees formally invoked her rights, and so none jeopardized her relationship in the
way that Engel and Munger's theory hypothesizes, the "rightsver-

Id. at 83.
Id.
7 Id. at 96-97.
76
Id. at 84-85.
7 Id. at 84.
78Id. at 85-86. According to the authors, this is because the continuum of mechanisms regulating social interactions spans from the formal to the informal. Id. at 84.
Legal rights are the far end of the formal portion of this continuum and have little
impact on the informal end. Id. Where relationships are strong, legal rights play an
insignificant role. Where relationships are weak, legal rights play a strong role. Id.
73
74
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sus relationship" model is inapposite to their examination of ADA
rights.79
"Criticalrights theory" posits that formally granted rights are illusions and tools of oppression. Because of the presence of legal
"rights,"oppressed people do not view themselves as being subordinated.80Yet, Rights of Inclusion asserts that the constitutive effects of legal rights depend on context. Rights are not harmful for
those who do not have a mistaken belief that the mere possession
of legal rights is indicative of the possession of social equality.81
Furthermore, at a minimum, interviewees were not "fooled" into a
false consciousness of rights. Hence, critical rights theory fails to
account for the ambiguity most interviewees felt about their
rights.82
In contrast, Engel and Munger aver that the ADA challenges
the historical view that disability means unemployability and reaffirms historical attitudes about disability, in the sense that it requires a differentiation of persons with disabilities from persons
without disabilities in a potentially stigmatizing way.83This recursive effect, both positive and negative, of the ADA on rights and
identity can be seen in Engel and Munger's comparison of Barry
Swygert's experiences with those of Raymond Militello. Although
Barry never formally invoked the ADA after the onset of his paralysis, the statute transformedhis self-perception and enabled him
to "reconstitute his identity" and retain his "ambitious" career
plans.84He became rights-conscious through "cultural and discursive" shifts that were engendered as a result of the legislation itself,
and he became an active participant in rights-identitythrough "its
context-creating effects."85

79

Id. at 97. At the same time, the authors generally subscribe both to classical rights

theory and the rightsversusrelationshipmodel in that they see legal rightsas having
both positiveand negativeeffects on identity.Id. at 86.
80See
81See

id. at 87.
id.

82Id.at 97.
83
Id. at 116-22.
84Id.at 102.
85 Id; cf. Peter Blanck,CivilWarPensionsand
Disability,62 Ohio St. L.J. 109 (2001)
(identifyinghistorical,political,and social forcesbehindthe conceptionsof disability);
Peter David Blanck & MichaelMillender,Before DisabilityCivil Rights:Civil War
Pensionsand the Politicsof Disabilityin America,52 Ala. L. Rev. 1 (2000) (same).
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Thus, Barry believes that the importance of the ADA is not in
its formal invocation, but in the way its very existence transforms
society, people, and their relationships.86In contrast, Raymond
Militello, who has a learning disability, sees himself as abnormal
and thus he sees the ADA as wrongfully preferring abnormality to
normalcy.87While he appreciates the more positive accommodations he has received in college, Raymond hesitates to view himself
as a "rights-bearer,"instead envisioning himself as a wily person
taking advantage of any means to get in the "back door" and gain
advantage over his peers.88Moreover, Raymond explicitly (and
ironically) opposes the ADA as an unnecessary governmental intrusion into the private sphere. He questions whether all those who
make use of the ADA, including himself, really need it.89
Accordingly, Rights of Inclusion asserts that because current
rights theory in its three major iterations fails to fully account for
the effects of the ADA on persons with disabilities, a new, more
appropriate rights theory is necessary. This paradigm would take
into account the facts that rights (1) become active in informal, extralegal ways; (2) are active when they transform the selfperception of the rights-holder;(3) produce cultural and discursive
shifts that impact the way that rights-holders view themselves and
how others view them; and (4) create new contexts that alter the
identities of rights-holders.0 As well, the impact of rights must be
viewed over time since temporal depth is necessary for a meaningful analysis of the effect that rights engender.91
The most crucial elements of Engel and Munger's framework
are a recognition of the centrality of work to adult identity and the
manner in which employment confers moral citizenship.92Unemployed people are marginalized and viewed as less than working
adults, resulting in a lessening of self-respect. Since, historically,
"disability"is a term associated with an inability to work, persons
with disabilities that hinder employment are threatened with a
86

Engel & Munger, supra note 15, at 103.
87Id.at 75.
88Id. at 74-77.
89
Id. at 75-77.
90
Id. at 94-96.
91
See id. at 98-104.
92
Id. at 116.
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lessening of self-respect, self-sufficiency, and self-reliance.93Consequently, for people with disabilities, work is the ability "to achieve
recognition as independent and worthy participantsin society."94
The assertion of the necessity for a new rights theory is demonstrated by Engel and Munger's description of three common discourses of rights95they found among interviewees: the market,96religion,97and racial justice.98Because dialectic impacts the way in
which disability, rights, and identity interact, Engel and Munger
maintain that providing a new rights theory framework creates a
method to understand and evaluate experience.9 Sid Tegler's experience, for example, demonstrates the marketplace discourse.??
Sid uses a cost-benefit approach to rights under the ADA to distance himself from his disability and the social stigma inherent in it
because he needs to view himself as being as capable an employee
as anyone else. Thus, he cannot support accommodation provisions
under the ADA without compromising his identity.10'The dis93Id.
94 Id. at
117;see also id. at 116-22.
95They describethe term "discourse"as being,
by definition,interactiveand intersubjective.It is the communicativemedium
throughwhichthe self interactswith and comes to be distributedamongothers,
therebyestablishinga sense of identity.Further,becausea discourseis a way of
thinkingand talkingabout experiences,narrationsof the self continuallydraw
on availablediscoursesto createand recreateidentity.
Id. at 143. These various "discourses,"as the authorsterm them, fundamentallyaffected how the intervieweesrespondedto and interactedwith the ADA: "If potential
rightsholders cannot articulatea disparitybetween the treatmentexpected and the
treatmentactuallyreceived,they may come to acceptas naturaland appropriatewhat
might otherwise be considered exclusion or discrimination.They can perceive no
spacewithinwhichADA rightscould become active."Id. at 144.
96 This discourseties into how persons with disabilitiesconstructtheir identities as
employees,specificallyin relationto notions of cost-benefitand reasonableness.Id. at
152-53.
97By which the authorsmean "a resourcethat enables [the interviewees]to understand and express their concepts of self, disability,employment,and the law." Id. at
159.
98 This term describes"the use of
concepts and languagethat are widely sharedin
our society as Americanstalk-and sometimesheatedlydisagree-about fairnessand
justicefor racialminorities."Id. at 144-45.
99Interestingly,they found all three discoursespresent and effective amongst the
interviewees.Id. at 165-67.
Id. at 153-56;see also id. at 106-32.
?00
101Id. at 153-55.
Additionally,the authorsnote that when confrontedwith discrimination, "Sid'sapproach... was to express his disdainand move on." Id. at 109. Sid
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course of the market, then, protects his identity as a capable
worker.102

The discourse of faith can be seen in the life story of Georgia
Steeb, who is conflicted between her Christian duty to forgive
rights-violators and her role as a rights-bearer.In theory, Georgia
believes she should assert her rights when they are violated, but
she also believes that her Christian faith requires that she turn the
other cheek. As a result, Georgia can pursue only the most egregious violations, in accordance with her faith.103
The discourse of racial justice can be seen in the circumstance of
Ron Zander, who equates the ADA's reasonable accommodations
provisions with affirmative action. In so doing, he distinguishes,
somewhat hazily, between "discrimination"that he considers to be
legally allowable, refusal of preferential treatment (specifically, a
refusal to extend more time to dyslexics to deal with job-related
paperwork), and "prejudice"that is not legally allowable (for instance, refusing to hire someone like himself due to dyslexia). The
more closely analogous to race-based discriminationan employer's
action is, the more Ron thinks it should be illegal.04
II. EXPRESSIVE LAW SCHOLARSHIP

Expressive law scholarshipexamines the impact that the external
(the legal system) can have on the internal (individual behavior) by
altering social norms. This is an aspect of rights transformationnot
addressed in Rights of Inclusion. Alex Geisinger's "belief change"
theory offers a gloss on expressive law scholarship that explains
how those changes can be positive and predictive.

eventuallybecame self-employed.Id. at 110. Speakingof employers,customers,and
clients,Sid believes them to be indifferent,ratherthan hostile, to people with disabilities, and thinksthat they will not care about disabilitieswhen they are convincedthat
with someone is in theirfinancialinterest.Id. at 112-13.
working
102
Id. at 153-56.
103

Id. at 159-63.

04 at
Id. 149-51;cf. SamuelR. Bagenstos,"RationalDiscrimination,"Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 Va. L. Rev. 825, 833-37 (2003)
(arguingthat discriminationagainstthe disabledis as morallyreprehensibleas racial
discrimination).
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A. The Goals of Expressive Law Scholarship
Traditionallaw and economics literatureoperates from the premise that people act rationally to maximize their own utility when
Under
choosing among alternativelyavailable courses of conduct.105
this framework, known as rational choice theory, law operates by
varying the cost to an individual of satisfyingher exogenous preferences through the use of sanctions.06For any given activity,increasing the associatedcost will decrease that individual'sdesire to choose
that opportunity;conversely, a decrease in cost will encourage the
In
individual to satisfy her desire by choosing that opportunity.107
other words, manipulatingthe opportunityset availableto a given actor will alter her subsequentchoices.
This standard economic account has proved a useful baseline
method for modeling human behavior and thereby predictingthe effects of particularpolicies.'08Scholarswho have challenged the traditional model have done so primarilyon two grounds.'0Those exter105
See WilliamJ. Baumol & Alan S. Blinder,Economics:Principlesand Policy 99103 (8thed. 1999);MarkPerlman& CharlesR. McCann,Jr.,The Pillarsof Economic
Understanding:Factorsand Markets301 (2000) (describingthe marketas a "modelof
allocativeefficiency").
'06"In the vision of law that dominateseconomics-influencedlegal theory, law imposes sanctionsto solve problems...." RichardH. McAdams,A Focal Point Theory
of ExpressiveLaw, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1649, 1650 (2000). ProfessorMcAdamsuses this
axiomas a departurepoint for his versionof expressivelaw theory.
107For a discussionof this point made in the context of criminalactivity,see Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt,An EconomicAnalysis of the CriminalLaw as a PreferenceShapingPolicy,1990Duke L.J.1.
08Two Nobel laureates
unabashedlydefend this model from the perspectivethat
preferencesare relativelystatic and that studyingvariabletaste is a futile endeavor.
See George J. Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De GustibusNon Est Disputandum,Am.
Econ. Rev., Mar.1977,at 76.
109
Two otherchallengesthatdo not originatefromquestioningthe rationalityof behavioralconstraintsarenonethelessworthmentioning.The firstis feministlaw and economics, notablythe work of ProfessorHadfield.See, e.g., GillianK. Hadfield,Households
at Work:Beyond LaborMarketPolicies to Remedythe GenderGap, 82 Geo. L.J.89,
89-90 (1993) (challengingthe circularreasoningused by those law and economics
scholarswho explain gender wage differentialsby referenceto the historicalhousehold structurewithoutalso questioningthe existence of this arrangement);GillianK.
Hadfield,Flirtingwith Science:RichardPosner on the Bioeconomicsof SexualMan,
106 Harv.L. Rev. 479, 502-03 (1992) (reviewingRichardA. Posner,Sex and Reason
(1992)). The second is environmentallaw and economics.See generally Daniel H.
Cole, EnvironmentalProtection and Economic Growth: Lessons from Socialist
Europe, in Law and Economics:New and Critical Perspectives295 (Robin Paul
Malloy & ChristopherK. Brauneds., 1995) (tracingthe comparativefailureof envi-
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nal to the disciplineof law and economics have faulted it on the basis
that the frameworkassumes rationalbehavior and is therefore either
or morallywanting.11
methodologicallydeficient'10
commentators
By contrast,
generally satisfied with the law and
economic schema, but wishing to extend and add greater nuance to
its reach, have advocatedfor greater explorationinto how law shapes
choices beyond the use of traditional sanctions. Typically this is
achieved either by changing the social meaning of a behavior, and
thus the likelihood of being socially sanctioned for undertakingthat
behavior, or by altering individual preference so that people no
longer desire to satisfy a particulartaste.12Both emendations result
in individuals choosing a previously secondary course of conduct.
This scholarlyagenda, which generallymay be referredto as the field

ronmentalprotectionin socialist Europe);Jeff L. Lewin, Toward a New Ecological
Law & Economics,in Law and Economics:New and CriticalPerspectives,supra,at
249, 250 (suggesting"the emergenceof a new 'ecologicallaw & economics'that will
addresssuch issues as ecologicalscarcityand environmentalequityfrom a perspective
that overcomesthe limitationsof the neoclassicalapproach").
"0For two early criticisms,see Mark Kelman, ConsumptionTheory, Production
Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem,52 S. Cal. L. Rev. 669 (1979) and Duncan Kennedy,Cost-BenefitAnalysisof EntitlementProblems:A Critique,33 Stan.L.
Rev. 387 (1981). As an aside, the traditionallaw and economics academyacknowledges that not all behavioris rationaland, therefore, accountableby the traditional
model. See, e.g., The Law and Economicsof IrrationalBehavior(FrancescoParisi&
Vernon Smith eds., forthcoming2004) (exploringmodels of irrationalbehaviorand
the implicationsfor the design of legal rules and institutions);Robert E. Scott, The
Limitsof BehavioralTheories of Law and Social Norms,86 Va. L. Rev. 1603 (2000)
some of the limitations).
(noting
111
See, e.g., Henry S. Richardson,The Stupidityof the Cost-Benefit Standard,in
Cost-Benefit Analysis: Legal, Economic, and Philosophical Perspectives 135 (Mat-

thew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner eds., 2001) (questioningthe validityof the entire rational economic model); MarthaC. Nussbaum,The Costs of Tragedy:Some Moral
Limitsof Cost-BenefitAnalysis,29 J. Legal Stud.1005,1007-08(2000).
112LawrenceLessigdescribesthis schismas one between the "Old ChicagoSchool,"
whose adherentsbelieve that normsact independentlyof law, and the "New Chicago
School,"whoseadherentsconsiderwhatimpactlawshaveuponnorms.LawrenceLessig,
The New ChicagoSchool,27 J. LegalStud.661, 673-80 (1998).For stalwartsof the Old
ChicagoSchool-for example,JudgeRichardPosner-law and socialnormsscholarship
enrichestraditionallaw andeconomicwork,butdoes not supercedeit. Specifically,Judge
Posnerbelievesthatsocialmeaningis "somethingthatcomesready-madein the soundor
gestureor practice,"but is not itselfinstilledinto an act by law. See RichardA. Posner,
SocialNorms,SocialMeaning,and EconomicAnalysisof Law:A Comment,27 J. Legal
Stud.553,563 (1998).
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of law and social norms,11has inspired an outpouring of behavioral
economic scholarship11examining the effect of law and norms on a
range of individual behavior beyond the traditional effect of sanctions."15
113

Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (1991),
is considered by many to be the determining work in the general field of law and social norms and therefore the wellspring of much of what followed. See, e.g., Richard
H. McAdams, Signaling Discount Rates: Laws, Norms, and Economic Methodology,
110 Yale L.J. 625, 626 (2001) (reviewing Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms
(2000)) (opining that "[t]he seminal work in the law-and-economics camp is unquestionably Robert Ellickson's"). According to McAdams, Posner's 2000 work "represents the first book-length treatment of this subject by a law professor since Ellickson." Id. Several symposia have been convened on the subject. For example, see
Symposium, Law, Economics, & Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1643 (1996); Symposium,
The Legal Construction of Norms, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1577 (2000); Symposium, Social
Norms, Social Meaning, and the Economic Analysis of Law, 27 J. Legal Stud. 537
(1998). A cogent overview of this scholarship is provided by Robert C. Ellickson, The
Evolution of Social Norms: A Perspective from the Legal Academy, in Social Norms
35 (Michael Hechter & Karl-Dieter Opp eds., 2001).
1
See generally Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471 (1998) (envisioning how law and economics analysis may be
improved by attention to insight about actual human behavior); Russell Korobkin,
Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psychological Power of Default
Rules and Form Terms, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1583, 1584-88 (1998) (analyzing the impact
on contract negotiations of negotiator biases for the status quo and inaction, as well as
expressive law and economics (which examines how legal norms can alter social norms)).
Referring to themselves as "the radical middle," these last scholars are represented by
their own section in the American Association of Law Schools and contribute to the
publication of the Journal of Socio-Economics.
15
See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. Legal Stud. 115 (1992) (diamond merchants); Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damages, Social Norms, and Economic Analysis,
60 Law & Contemp. Probs. 73 (1997) (punitive damages); Robert D. Cooter,
Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model of Decentralized Law,
14 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 215 (1994) (commercial law); Melvin A. Eisenberg,
Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1253 (1999) (corporate law);
Steven Hetcher, Creating Safe Social Norms in a Dangerous World, 73 S. Cal. L. Rev.
1 (1999) (torts); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 591 (1996) (criminal punishment); Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 Harv.
L. Rev. 1003 (1995) (antidiscrimination law); Richard H. McAdams, Group Norms,
Gossip, and Blackmail, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2237 (1996) (blackmail); Eric A. Posner,
Family Law and Social Norms, in The Fall and Rise of Freedom of Contract 256 (F.
H. Buckley ed., 1999) (family law); Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case
of Tax Compliance, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1781 (2000) (tax); Eric A. Posner, The Legal
Regulation of Religious Groups, 2 Legal Theory 33 (1996) (religion); Elizabeth S.
Scott & Robert E. Scott, A Contract Theory of Marriage, in The Fall and Rise of
Freedom of Contract, supra, at 201 (marriage); Michelle J. White, Why It Pays to File
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A recent branch of law and social norms scholarshipis the related
area of expressive law, which seeks to understandlaw's potential for
proscribingor changingthe social significanceof particularbehavior
to individuals,thereby altering their behavior."6This is because the
new law either carriesa symbolicsocial meaning,or because it affects
the way individualsmediate that symbolic social meaning.l7 What is
crucial to this analysis is the nexus between law, norms, and social
meaning. When designed appropriately,law can cause individualsto
alter their own behavior because either the law induces them to
change their tastes (internalization),or creates a fear of bearing social sanctions (second order sanctions), or because of pressure
brought to bear upon them through societal sanction (third order
sanctions)."8
An example commonly used in the literatureto illustratethe effect
of norm changes on behavior is regulationsprohibitingpublic smoking.119
Suppose a society exists in which most people smoke regularly,

for Bankruptcy:A CriticalLook at the IncentivesUnder U.S. PersonalBankruptcy
Law and a Proposalfor Change,65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 685 (1998) (bankruptcy).
116
See, e.g., Robert Cooter, ExpressiveLaw and Economics,27 J. Legal Stud. 585
(1998) (describingthe role of law in the developmentof social norms,and socioeconomiclawandeconomics,whichseeksto injectpsychologicalandsocialfactorsrelatedto
wealth and race into otherwise"neutral"economic analyses);LawrenceLessig, The
Regulationof SocialMeaning,62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 943 (1995)(examiningthe socialconstructionof orthodoxyand its placein the law);McAdams,supranote 106 (suggesting
that law may be alternativelyconceptualizedfor its expressive,as well as its traditionally acknowledged,enforcement functions);Richard H. McAdams,An Attitudinal
Theory of ExpressiveLaw, 79 Or. L. Rev. 339 (2000) (highlightingthe power of the
approvalor disapprovalof law in shapingbehavior);CassR. Sunstein,On the Expressive Functionof Law, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2021 (1996)(consideringhow legal statements
mightbe designedto changesocialnorms).
117
Lessig, supra note 112, at 681-83.

8This account is, naturallyenough for an emerging field, a synthesis of several
views ratherthan a univocalproposition.For example, Robert Cooter describeslaw
as having two very differentfunctions:enactingnew obligationsfrom the top down
(as in the case of regulatorylaw), or growingfrom the bottom up (throughsocial
norm enforcement).See Robert Cooter, NormativeFailureTheory of Law, 82 Cornell L. Rev. 947, 947-49 (1997). I conflate Cooter'stwo functionsin this Review because I see them as complementaryratherthan as dichotomous.For a comprehensive
literaturereview of the developmentof the field and the nuancescontainedtherein,
see Geisinger,supranote 22.
119
See, e.g., Geisinger,supranote 22, at 44-48;McAdams,supranote 106,at 1718-21;
Sunstein,supranote 116, at 2032-34;RichardH. McAdams& JaniceNadler,A Third
Model of Legal Compliance:Testing for ExpressiveEffects in a Hawk/Dove Game,
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either because they consider it pleasurableor it is otherwise in keeping with regular social mores. Having learned that smoking engenders both health care costs (cancer and emphysema,to name two examples) and environmental costs (poor air quality), the legislature
passes a law that prohibitspublic smoking and fines violators.20The
effect of this statute on MarlboroMan, an exuberantsmoker, can be
threefold. Passage of the anti-smoking ordinance can (1) educate
Marlboro Man that smoking really is a bad activity in which to engage, not only for himself, but also for fellow citizens within reach of
second-hand smoke and for animals who may choke on cigarette
butts, and so change his desire to smoke; or (2) have no affect at all
on MarlboroMan's personal desire to smoke, but result in fear of social condemnationfrom others who witness his public smoking causing him either to curb his addictionor to practiceit in private;and/or,
in combination with either or both of the previous two possibilities,
(3) cause other members of Marlboro Man's society to bear social
pressure and condemnation upon him until he abstains from public
smoking.12
B. Alex Geisinger's "Belief Change" Theory
Some law and economics scholars have criticized the account of
law's effect upon norm change contained in expressive law as being
descriptive and lacking predictive effect.22There are also scholars
who have raised questions about whether law itself can even have an
expressiveeffect in internalizingnormativevalue choices.'23
The John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy Working
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 285, at http://lsr.nellco.org/yale/lepp/papers/285.
The role of the legislature in signaling preferences and endorsing certain outcomes is part of Richard McAdams's continuing and intrepid scholarship on expressive law. See, e.g., McAdams & Nadler, supra note 119; Dhammika Dharmapala &
Richard H. McAdams, The Condorcet Jury Theorem and the Expressive Function of
Law: A Theory of Informative Law, 5 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 1 (2003).
121 For
examples in the literature, see Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming
White Collar Criminals: A Proposal for Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
42 J.L. & Econ. 365, 366 (1999) (criminal shaming) and Lessig, supra note 116, at 971
(dueling).
122 See,
e.g., Scott, supra note 110, at 1606-07; Stigler & Becker, supra note 108, at
81-83.
123
See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1363 (2000); Matthew D. Adler, Linguistic Meaning, Nonlinguistic "Expression," and the Multiple Variants of Expressivism: A Reply to Professors Anderson
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In response to these valid criticisms,Alex Geisinger has proffered
a "belief change" theory of expressive law that seeks to model and
predict behavior in the context of social norm change.24Drawing on
studies by social psychologists,he points out that two factors mainly
influence individual decisions as to whether to engage in particular
behavior: the individual'sattitude towards the behavior, and the individual's belief about how society at large views that behavior.'25
Combined, these two factors help determine how an individualwill
act in a given circumstance;in other words,a person's attitude (or belief certainty) about the consequences of satisfyinga particularpreference will govern whether she will satisfythat preference.'26
According to Geisinger, law impacts an individual'scertainty regarding the consequences of her actions either by providing additional information about that action (for instance, informing Marlboro Man that smoking causes lung cancer), or through its influence
on an individual's"inferentialreasoning process" (for example, that
despite lobbying by the tobacco industry,which funds many of the
representatives'election campaigns,the legislaturenonetheless bans
public smoking).'27This change in belief may occur because people
were ambivalentabout particularconduct, and the law's passage has
now "tipped"those fence-sitters towards an equilibrium(Marlboro
Man had heard that smoking was unhealthy, but was as yet unconvinced), or because individuals with little information regarding an
activityhave now updated their knowledge and beliefs subsequentto
the law's passage (that is, all of MarlboroMan's friends smoked, and
none had cancer, but a larger empirical data set has now been provided).28
Similarly,passage of a law will provide information to Marlboro
Man on the likelihood of being socially sanctioned. Marlboro Man
and Pildes, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1577 (2000); Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes,
Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1503 (2000).
See Geisinger, supra note 22.
125
Id. at 55-56; see also Martin Fishbein & Icek Ajzen, Belief, Attitude, Intention
and Behavior: An Introduction to Theory and Research 13-18 (1975) (outlining a
conceptual framework that suggests that the performance or nonperformance of a
specific behavior is determined by the person's intention to perform that behavior).
126
Geisinger, supra note 22, at 56, 62-63; see also Russell Veitch & Daniel Arkkelin,
Environmental Psychology: An Interdisciplinary Perspective 109 (1995) (discussing
the Fishbein-Ajzen "Reasoned Action Model" of behavior).
127 Geisinger, supra note 22, at 63-65.
128
Id. at 68-69.
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may believe that he is more likely to be sanctioned for smoking because people have a general belief that laws should be followed. In
addition, as Professors Richard McAdams and Robert Scott have
each pointed out, the fact that a legislature has passed the antismoking ordinanceprovides informationto individuals(especially in
light of the costs to legislators personally) that the majority of the
electorate believes the rule is just.'29
Thus, a belief change theory rests
on the mechanisms through which a law's passage will influence an
individual'sbehaviorbeyond the traditionalnotion of sanction.'30
Moreover, Geisinger explains that a belief change theory clarifies
the process of internalization,and its attendanteffect upon subjective
norms, in a more complete manner than previous scholarship.This is
because internalizationcomes about as the result of law impactingattitude, ratherthan stimulatingthe subjectivenorm."3Returning once
more to the hypothetical Marlboro Man, he is initially surprisedby
the passage of the anti-smokinglaw because he knows that the legislators are either smokers or are heavily supported by tobacco-based
campaign funds. Ultimately, however, he infers from passage of the
law that smoking must indeed be a hazardous activity and changes
his attitude regardingsmoking in public. Henceforth, not only does
Marlboro Man refrain from public smoking, but he also castigates
fellow smokers when he catches them lighting up in public. This circumstance arises because Marlboro Man has internalizedhis preference change due to passage of the anti-smokingordinance.Should he
feel compelled to smoke in public due to a nicotine addiction, he
129
McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, supra note 116, at 362-63;
Scott, supra note 110, at 1624-25. Geisinger asserts that, while basically correct, neither of these explanations is as fully satisfactory as his belief change theory, since majoritarian compliance is "only one form of inferential belief change regarding the subnorm." Geisinger, supra note 22, at 70.
jective
130
This is because:
Passage of a law will likely affect attitudes toward the behavior by increasing or
decreasing the certainty with which beliefs regarding a behavior are held. Passage of a law may also affect an individual's belief about the subjective norm,
thus increasing or decreasing the likelihood that the individual will undertake
the behavior. Furthermore, the effects on belief certainty about a particular behavior or the subjective norm are measurable and can be combined in a meaningful way to predict the outcome of such changes on an individual's intent to
undertake a behavior. The belief change theory, therefore, provides a comprehensive and predictable means of analyzing the non-sanctioning effects of a law.
Geisinger,
supra note 22, at 65.
131
Id. at 66-67.
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would feel guilty about doing so even if no one was around to observe him.132
Nor is this phenomenon, accordingto Geisinger's model, merely
an instance of a belief change occurringwhile a preference remains
the same (that is, that MarlboroMan now recognizes the dangers of
smoking but only acts as he does in order to avoid second and third
order sanctions). This is because MarlboroMan now derives greater
utility from not smoking,or from stopping others from smoking,than
he does from smoking or by remainingsilent. As such, law may not
only provide greater information about given activities, it may also
act to change individuals'internal beliefs about the consequences of
those activities.'33Consequently, Geisinger's belief change theory
"accountsfor changes in social meaning by suggestingthat, at a particularpoint, law increasesthe certaintyof particularbeliefs about an
activitywhile decreasingother beliefs about it."134
III. DISABILITY RIGHTS: NORMS AND ASPIRATIONS

Extant socio-legal norms on disability rights view people with
disabilities as being inherently less capable than non-disabled people. In consequence, society views disability-relatedrights as "special" rights. These notions can be seen in recent Supreme Court
decisions. By contrast, the ADA seeks to eliminate artificial barriers to disabled participation and recognizes the equality of the disabled. This Part contrasts social and legal conventions regarding
people with disabilities to the aspirationsset forth in the ADA.
A. Existing Socio-Legal Norms on Disability Rights
Social convention equates disabled people's biological atypicality with inherent lesser ability. In consequence, prevailing sociolegal norms view disability rights as special rights. These views,
which combine to exclude people with disabilities from equal social
participation,can be seen in recent Supreme Court opinions.

132This hypotheticalparallels the example provided initially by Scott, supra note
110, at 1608,and elaboratedon by Geisinger,supranote 22, at 51, whichuses devoted
dog lovers.
note 22, at 68-70.
134Geisinger,supra
Id. at 72.
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1. InherentLesser Ability
A primary social convention regardingpeople with disabilities is
one that equates their biological atypicality with inherent lesser
ability. Perhaps the most damagingaspect of this concept, expressed
in sociological terms, is the belief that people with disabilities are
"inauthenticworkers."'35
Set against the backdrop of public policies that presume people
with disabilitiescan and should receive public assistancerather than
engage in employment,36this perception justifies the disadvantaged
socioeconomic position of workers with disabilities who are employed in lower paying or less demanding positions.'37This is a perception that the Court has implicitly endorsed. In Cleveland v. Policy ManagementSystem Corp., 38plaintiff Cleveland was deemed to
have ADA protection in retaining employment, even though she
had exercised a statutory entitlement to Social Security Disability
Insurance ("SSDI") benefits. The burden shifted to her, however,
to show that with reasonable accommodation she could overcome
the crucial aspects of the employment-related dysfunction on
which her SSDI application was based.39Thus, the Court preserved
the principle that an assignment to the disability classification carries a presumption of inability, and continued to expect individuals
so classified to prove themselves exceptions to this presumption in
135The

phrase is drawn from Schultz, supra note 5, at 1892.
someone as disabled under the Social Security system "incorporates
common expectations and shared values about what infirmities a person ought not to
have to bear and keep working." Lance Liebman, The Definition of Disability in Social Security and Supplemental Security Income: Drawing the Bounds of Social Welfare Estates, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 833, 853 (1976). See generally Harlan Hahn, Accommodations and the ADA: Unreasonable Bias or Biased Reasoning?, 21 Berkeley J.
Emp. & Lab. L. 166, 183-85 (2000) (characterizing the development of Social Security
Insurance ("SSI") and SSDI under the Nixon administration as one intended to keep
disabled people out of the workplace); Anita Silvers & Michael Ashley Stein, Disability, Equal Protection, and the Supreme Court: Standing at the Crossroads of Progressive and Retrogressive Logic in Constitutional Classification, 35 U. Mich. J.L. Reform
81, 124-25 (2002) (referencing "welfarist" policies that presume people with disabilities will not engage in employment opportunity).
137
In describing the parallel position of women, Schultz points out the odd position
taken by Professor Becker, who maintains that women are occupationally disadvantaged because of their "comparative advantage" at child care and housework. See
Schultz, supra note 5, at 1893-98.
136Defining

138

526 U.S. 795 (1999).

139

Id. at 798.
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order to gain access to the normal opportunity range, including
employment.'4
2. Special Rights
Because socio-legal norms operate from the premise that disabled workers are less capable than their non-disabled peers, an attendant social convention is that disability rights are special
rights.'14As a result, provisions that integrate people with disabilities into the workplace are perceived of as raising those individuals
above an equality equilibrium,rather than leveling an uneven playing field.142
This perspective is aptly demonstrated by the Supreme Court's
opinion in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v.
Garrett.143
Patricia Garrett sued the University after being demoted
from her nursing supervisor position because she had undergone
breast cancer treatment.44The Court did not reach the merits of
her claim, ruling that as a state actor the defendant was immune
from Garrett's private ADA suit for monetary damages.'45Nonetheless, Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion upheld as constitutional state workplace practices discriminating against people
with disabilities for inherent economic reasons.'46 This is because
"it would be entirely rational" for state employers "to conserve
scarce financial resources by hiring employees who are able to use
existing facilities" rather than comply with ADA requests.47Ac140
Id.;cf. Barnhartv. Thomas,124 S. Ct. 376 (2003) (holdingthat people are not disabled for social securitypurposesif they are functionallycapableof some type of employment,even if the position they once held is either terminatedor no longer exists
in the nationaleconomy).
141
See Peter J. Rubin,Equal Rights,SpecialRights,and the Natureof AntidiscriminationLaw,97 Mich.L. Rev. 564, 565 (1998) (notingthat categorizingrightsas special
rights "conflate[s]antidiscriminationlaws that essentially mirrorthe Constitution's
own commandwith affirmativeaction provisionswhose constitutionalitycan be determinedunder currentlaw only after they have been subjectedto searchingjudicial
scrutiny").
142
addressthis perspective,which has become canonicalin the legal literature,in
Stein, supranote 28.

143531 U.S. 356 (2001).
144

Id. at 362.
Id. at 360.
146
Id. at 369-72.

'45

147

Id. at 372.
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cordingly, state actors "could quite hardheadedly-and perhaps
hardheartedly-hold to job-qualification requirements which do
not make allowance for the disabled."'48Although Garrett did not
request any form of accommodation, the Chief Justice characterized her ADA claims as being for "special accommodations."'49
Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment, noting that the adjudication of ADA claims was not an equality issue.50Rather, that determination necessitated an internal battle between "our own human instincts" which cause us to shun disabled people, and "the
better angels of our nature" that sympathize for "those disadvanHence, according to
taged by mental or physical impairments."'15
the Court's ruling, ADA rights involve something more than
equality, and are motivated by humanitarianconcerns rather than
a belief in the equality of the disabled.152
B. ADA Disability RightsAspirations
Among the ADA's normative aspirationswere the elimination of
artificialbarriersto disabled persons' equal participationin society
and a concurrentsocial recognitionof their civil rights.'53
at 367-8.
Id. at 368.
150JusticeKennedy was joined by Justice O'Connor. Id. at 374-75. (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
151
Id. at 375-76.
152
In contrast to the majority, Justice Breyer dissented on the ground that "Congress compiled a vast legislative record" which documented extensive and "powerful
evidence of discriminatory treatment" of the disabled that both "implicate[d] state
governments" and supported the rights-based theory evoked by the plaintiffs. Id. at
377-78 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
153
The qualification reflects the fact that numerous interpretations are possible. For
example, Professor Samuel Bagenstos has offered four distinct analyses of the principles that either underlie or ought to motivate ADA jurisprudence. First, the ADA
could be seen as by and large extending protection only to those individuals subject to
stigma and systematic disadvantage. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination,
Stigma, and "Disability," 86 Va. L. Rev. 397, 401 (2000). Second, the statute can be
viewed through the lens of risk regulation. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans
with Disabilities Act as Risk Regulation, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1479 (2001). Third, the
ADA was "sold" to Congress on the notion of making disabled people independent
of public assistance. See Bagenstos, supra note 6, at 953-75. Fourth, the legislation
was intended, by means of moral imperative, to remedy discrimination. See Bagenstos, supra note 104, at 837-46. For a diverse treatment of the issue of disability identity formation, see Symposium, Disability & Identity, 44 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 907
(2003).
'48Id.
149
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1. EliminatingArtificial Barriers
During hearings on the ADA, Congress was presented with a
catalog of evidence on the historical exclusion of people with disabilities from American society.54Among the more dramatic evidence presented were results of an independent nationwide poll of
one thousand Americans with disabilitiess55that found that twothirds of working-age people with disabilities were unemployed,'56
and that two-thirds of those individuals wanted to work but could
not do so because of employer attitudes.'57The study also found
that during the year prior to the ADA hearings nearly two-thirds
of individuals with disabilities did not attend movies;'58threefourths of the disabled population did not see live theatrical or musical performances;l59two-thirds of disabled people had not attended sporting events;'60seventeen percent did not eat in restaurants;161 and thirteen percent had not shopped in grocery stores.'62

154

Congresssummarizedits conclusionsas to this evidence in the ADA's Findings
section. 42 U.S.C. ? 12101(2000);Moreover,"[h]istorically,society has tended to isolate and segregate handicappedpeople. Despite some improvements... discrimination againsthandicappedpersonscontinuesto be a seriousand pervasivesocial problem." U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, Accommodatingthe Spectrumof Individual
Abilities 159 (1983).
155
Louis Harris& Associates, Inc., The InternationalCenter for the Disabled Survey of DisabledAmericans:BringingDisabledAmericansinto the Mainstream(1986)
[hereinafterHarris/ICDSurvey].These resultswere summarizedto Congressby the
Presidentof that organizationduringhearingson the ADA. See GuaranteedJob OpportunityAct of 1987:Joint Hearingon S. 777 Before the Subcomm.on Employment
and Productivityand Subcomm.on the Handicappedof the Sen. Comm. on Labor
and Human Resources, 100th Cong., at 9 (1987) (statement of HumphreyTaylor,
President,Louis Harris& Associates,Inc.) (cited in S. Rep. No. 101-116,at 8 (1989)).
For a thoroughoverviewof the ADA by one of its drafters,see Robert L. Burgdorf,
Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implicationsof a SecondGenerationCivil RightsStatute,26 Harv.C.R.-C.L.L. Rev. 413, 441-58 (1991).For a
good journalisticaccount, see Joseph P. Shapiro,No Pity: People with Disabilities
Forginga New CivilRightsMovement105-41 (1993).
156Harris/ICD
Survey,supranote 155, at 47.
157
Id. at 50-51.
58

Id. at 37, 39.

159

Id.

Id.

160
161
162

Id. at 40.
Id. at 39.
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These findings were corroborated both with more empirically rigorous evidence'63and with anecdotal evidence.16
As a result of those hearings, Congress was persuaded that the
overall status of disabled people in America was a dismal one, concluding that disabled Americans have historically been "relegated
to a position of political powerlessness in our society,"'65and "continually encounter various forms of discrimination."' Consequently, the legislators found that people with disabilities have
been denied equal opportunities in society, including employment,
education, transportation, access to public services, and voting.'67
Congress, moreover, identified the source of this exclusion as an
artificial one, sustained by the "continuing existence of unfair and
unnecessary discrimination and prejudice."'6Among the forms of
unnecessary exclusion encountered by people with disabilities on a
daily basis, Congress noted "the discriminatoryeffects of architectural, transportation,and communication barriers."'69
Accordingly, Congress premised the ADA on the belief that the
repercussions of having a disability are often mutable and can be
relieved when the social environment accommodates physical and

For example,census data indicatedat that time that more than twentypercentof
working age individualswith disabilities were below the poverty level. National
Councilon the Handicapped,TowardIndependence5 (1986).Previoustestimonybefore the Senate had concludedthat "by almost any definition... disabledAmericans
are uniquely underprivilegedand disadvantaged.They are much poorer, much less
well educated and, having much less social life, enjoy fewer amenities and have a
lower level of life satisfactionthan other Americans."GuaranteedJob Opportunity
Act of 1987:JointHearingon S. 777, supranote 155,at 9.
64
The more compellinganecdotalevidence includedthe following:testimonyby a
wheelchair-usingfutureundersecretaryof the Departmentof Educationwho was removed from an auction house for being deemed "disgustingto look at"; testimony
about individualswith Down Syndromewho were bannedfrom a zoo because of the
keeper's fear they would frightenthe chimpanzees;testimonythat an academically
competitiveand nondisruptivechild was barredfrom attendingpublicschool because
of a teacher'sallegationthat his physicalappearance"produceda nauseatingeffect"
upon classmates;and testimonyabout a competentarthriticwomanwho was denied a
job by a college because of its trustees' belief that "normalstudents shouldn'tsee
her."S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 6-8 (1989).
165
42 U.S.C. ? 12101(a)(7) (2000).
66
?
Id. 12101(a)(5).
167 Id. ?
12101(a)(3).
68
Id. ? 12101(a)(9).
169 Id. ?
12101(a)(5).
163
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cognitive difference instead of excluding it.'70By recognizing that
many disadvantages associated with disability are the result of social construct rather than biological destiny, the ADA seeks to
eliminate an environment that is artificially hostile to those impairments."7
2. Recognizing Equality
Policymakers considering how to rectify historical inequities,
whether motivated by reasons of equality or by a desire to redistribute social resources, are normally faced with choosing between
the options of regulation (for example, antidiscriminationlegislation) and tax-and-spend (also called subsidy) programs.'72Indeed,
several commentators have advocated for subsidies in lieu of the
ADA's mandates as a way of providing employers with incentives
to accommodate and retain workers with disabilities.173
170
171

See Silvers & Stein, supra note 136, at 89-98.
As such, it is fair to say that the ADA comports with the social model of disability

that is assertedby most DisabilityStudiescommentators.See Liachowitz,supranote
28;
Scotch,supranote 28;Wendell,supranote 28;Amundson,supranote 28.
172
See generallyMarkKelman,Strategyor Principle?The Choice between Regulation and Taxation 81-94 (1999) (exploringthe relationshipbetween regulationand
cost-bearingburdens);Robert Howse, Retrenchment,Reform or Revolution? The
Shift to Incentivesand the Futureof the RegulatoryState, in Regulation,Economics
and the Law 259, 259-96 (Anthony I. Ogus ed., 2001) (exploringthe alternativesof
regulationand incentives);CassR. Sunstein,The Functionsof RegulatoryStatutes,in
Regulation,Economicsand the Law, supra,at 3, 3-34 (exploringthe natureand uses
of regulatorystatutes).The general economic efficiencyand prudentialproprietyof
both regulationand tax-and-spendprogramsform part of an old debate within the
field of publicfinance.See generallyRobert Howse, supra(assertingthat government
can bringabout social changewithoutreturningto command-and-control
approaches
or relyingon economicallyself-interestedmarketbehavior).
173 See,
e.g., RichardA. Epstein,ForbiddenGrounds:The Case AgainstEmployment
DiscriminationLaws480-94 (1992) (criticizingthe ADA as economicallyinefficient);
StewartJ. Schwab& Steven L. Willborn,ReasonableAccommodationof Workplace
Disabilities,44 Wm. & MaryL. Rev. 1197, 1276-83 (2003) (arguingfor an extension
of the ADA by allowing disabled employees to pay for their extra-reasonableaccommodations);Sue A. Krenek,Note, Beyond ReasonableAccommodation,72 Tex.
L. Rev. 1969, 2009-13 (1994) (proposing to effectuate accommodationsthrough a
public-privatepartnershipwherein private employers pay for permanentimprovements to their physicalplantsand the federalgovernmentpays for the rest);Scott A.
Moss & Daniel A. Malin, Note, Public FundingFor DisabilityAccommodations:A
Rational Solution to Rational Discriminationand the Disabilities of the ADA, 33
Harv. C.R.-C.L.L. Rev. 197, 219-31 (1998) (arguingfor a grant system to federally
fund reasonabledisabilityaccommodationin the workplace).
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By conceiving of ADA accommodation costs as antidiscrimination rather than by characterizingit as a subsidy program, however,
Congress sent a clear message that the ADA's remedies are intended to correct past injustice rather than acting as a charitable
handout. Congress declared that the statute's main purpose was
"to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities,"174by promulgating "clear, strong, consistent, [and] enforceable standards addressing"both individual and systematic forms of
discrimination.175
This language indicates that Congress, through passage of the
ADA, wanted to bring about sweeping changes in social policy.
Hence, Congress's overt intention in promulgating the statute was
to raise the level at which social exclusions of the disabled would
be examined by courts in the future.176
Moreover, in its legislative
used
culled
from Supreme Court decifindings Congress
language
The use of this
sions approving equal protection classifications.177
in
the
to
what
the Supreme
ADA, responding
specific language
Court required for heightened constitutional scrutiny circa 1990,
demonstrates that Congress was consciously attempting to frame
ADA remedies as part of an antisubordinationagenda, which is a
classicgoal of civil rightslaw.178
IV. AN INITIALEXPRESSIVE
LAWANALYSISOFTHEADA

An initial expressive law analysis of the ADA indicates that the
statute has the potential to legislate a belief change regardingindividuals with disabilities by educating mainstream individuals about
17442

U.S.C. ? 12101(b)(1) (1994).

Id.? 12101(b)(2).
176
175

Id. ? 12101; see also Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 613 (1999)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The congressional findings... serve as a useful aid for
courts to discern the sorts of discrimination with which Congress was concerned.");
Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 494 (1999) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (opining that the findings section affords "[t]he strongest clues to Congress' perception of
the domain of the Americans with Disabilities Act").
177
See Burgdorf, supra note 155, at 436; Silvers & Stein, supra note 136, at 88-96.
178See Bagenstos, supra note 104, at 833-35; Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination
Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1003,1007-10 (1986);
Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 107, 15455 (1976); Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 Ga. L. Rev. 245, 247-49
(1983).
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people with disabilities, and by creating tri-order sanctions against
discrimination. Moreover, during the period in which this belief
change is effectuated, the ADA imposes a financial sanction for discrimination.
A. Information:The Disability Rights Chronology
Unlike other minority groups, disabled Americans were empowered by civil rights legislation prior to a general elevation of social
consciousness about their circumstances and capabilities.'9 Before
marshalling support for the ADA's passage, the disability rights
movement encompassed hundreds of individual groups, each of
which represented and advocated on behalf of a different constituency.180
To take one example, the protest by deaf and hearing impaired
students demanding appointment of a deaf president at Gallaudet
University8' was unconnected to People First's advocacy on behalf
of developmentally disabled individuals.'82The campaign for the
ADA's passage unified these previously fractured advocates.'83De-

79
See generallyShapiro,supranote 155, at 184-210 (discussingthe rise and importance of self-advocacy);David Pfeiffer, Overviewof the Disability Movement:History, Legislative Record, and Political Implications,21 Pol'y Stud. J. 724, 724-32
(1993) (discussingthe historyand legislativerecordof the disabilitymovement).
180
Shapiro,supranote 155, at 61-63.
181
See generallyJack R. Gannon, The Week The World Heard Gallaudet (1989)
(explainingthe importanceof the studentprotestto the civil rightsmovementfor deaf
and hearingimpairedpeople);MaryElena Fernandez,GallaudetRecapturesSpiritof
Historic '88 March;On Anniversary,ProtestersUse Same Route to Press New Concerns for the Deaf, Wash. Post, Mar. 12, 1998, at B3 (explainingthat "studentsshut
down their school to demandthe appointmentof a deaf president").
'82For a descriptionof the People First movement, see Charles K. Curtis, The
ChangingRole of the People FirstAdvisor,Am. Rehabilitation,Apr.-May-June1984,
at 6 (describingthe developmentof a People First chapter);see also Dirk Johnson,
Tight Labor Supply Creates Jobs for the Mentally Disabled, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15,
1999,at Al (mentioninga People Firstprotestof an employer'shiringpractices).See
generally Independent Living for Physically Disabled People: Developing, Implementing,and EvaluatingSelf-Help RehabilitationPrograms(Nancy M. Crewe & Irving Kenneth Zola eds., 1983) (arguingthat disabledpeople, includingthe mentally
disabled,can and shouldlive independently).
18As noted by ADA lobbyistLiz Savage:"Peoplewith epilepsy now will be advocates for the same piece of legislation as people who are deaf.... That has never
happened before." Shapiro, supra note 155, at 126-27. See generally Richard K.
Scotch,Politics and Policy in the History of the DisabilityRights Movement,67 Mil-
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spite this temporary phenomenon, people with disabilities remain
largely uncoordinated, without either an acknowledged figurehead
(paralleling, for example, Jesse Jackson), or a central political vision (such as that expressed by NOW or NAACP) through which
to voice their concerns and desires.184
Because people with disabilities were empowered with civil
rights absent the necessary political tools and organization for inducing a general elevation of social consciousness, it falls to the
ADA to educate mainstream society about this previously unknown group. The statute does so in two ways. First, by providing
information through its legislative findings regarding the relative
position of people with disabilities in society.18 This is especially
true in its statements about artificialexclusion as the cause of social
participation, as opposed to inherent necessity.186Second, by requiring places of public accommodation be made readily accessiaffords people with disabilities a greater opportunity
ble, Title III187
to participate in social function. Together, these features lessen the
identity of the disabled as "other"and increase non-disableds' general familiaritywith people with disabilities.
Hence, following the ADA's promulgation, an employer who
reads the statute (or consults with a lawyer as to its effects), is presented with a different vision of disability identity than that previously held. If she had lacked information regardingthe role of disabled workers in society, the ADA has now updated her knowledge
and beliefs. If she had been ambivalent about excluding disabled
workers, the ADA's passage has now "tipped" her from being a
fence-sitter towards an inclusive equilibrium.Further, when an employer encounters people with disabilities in other areas of social
activity, say at a baseball game or when riding on public transportation, she becomes acclimated to the presence of persons from
whom she was previously sheltered. This effect, in combination
bank Q. 380, 389-90 (1989) (describingthe then-emergingpan-disabilityrightsmovement).
"84The formationand continuingdevelopmentof the AmericanAssociationof People with Disabilities,with its focus on securingaccessiblevoting and politicalparticipation, is a welcome and promising change. The website can be found at
http://www.aapd.com.
5
See supra Section III.B.
See supra Section III.B.
187
42 U.S.C. ?? 12181-12189(2000).
186
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with the educational information contained in the ADA, will influence an employer to embrace the notion that people with disabilities belong in the mainstream, including the workplace. This is true
particularly because the general impetus to exclude disabled people arises from paternalism rather than from animus.'88
B. Tri-OrderSanctions: The Moral Cost of Discrimination
Recall that Congress framed the ADA as a civil rights remedy,
rather than as a subsidy program.'89
In doing so, the legislature articulated a group-based antisubordination theory that was to eviscerate practices of systemic subordination.'9 As such, the ADA's
goal is to alter employer behavior that contributes to unacceptable
systemic patterns of social and economic subordination.'19This is
because of the premise that "employers who have a choice between participatingin a subordinating system and working (at reasonable cost) against such a system have a moral obligation to respond in a way that reduces subordination."'92
Framed as an antidiscriminationdevice, the ADA contains three
levels of sanctions that can change social norms towards people
with disabilities. First order sanctions cause individualsto alter their
own behavior because the law induces them to change their tastes.
Second order sanctionsoperate by creatinga fear of individualsbearing social sanction. Third order sanctions pressure individuals
throughsocietal sanction.

88See supra Section III.B.

189

See supraSectionIII.B.2.
90For two recent and thoughtfulvariationson this theme, see Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances:The Logic of AmericanAntidiscriminationLaw, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 1,
9, 17 (2000) (arguing that the rationale underlyingcurrent antidiscriminationlaw
seeks to liberateindividualsfrom the thrallof sociallyheld stereotypes,when in reality law itself can do no more than reshape the nature and content of those conventions);Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The AmericanCivil RightsTradition:Anticlassificationor Antisubordination,Issues in Legal Scholarship,The Originsand Fate
of AntisubordinationTheory, at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss2/artll
(averringthat
the normativegoals of anticlassificationand antisubordination,usuallyconsideredin
oppositionto each other, "arebetter understoodas regulatingoverlappinggroupsof
practicesand that their applicationshifts over time, in responseto social contestation
and social struggle").
191See
'92 Id.

Bagenstos, supra note 104, at 837-38.

at 838.
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As a first order sanction, the fact that Congresspromulgatedthe
ADA as an antidiscriminationmeasure signalsto individualsthat the
majorityof the electorate believes that discriminatingagainst the disabled is morally wrong. According to the belief change theory, and
also extrapolatingthe points that Professor Robert Cooter has made
in a more general context, 93 disability law can also influence the
process of belief change in two ways. First, in formulating a law regarding the disabled, and thus creating a legal duty on behalf of
employers, Congress can increase an individual employer's willingness to embrace that duty as part of her larger duties of citizenship.
Second, individuals who believe they are required to obey the
ADA's precepts will alter their preferences in order to behave in a
manner in accord with that mandate. These two processes "tip" an
individual's behavior towards a new equilibrium of behavior.
Even if the ADA does not convince individual employers who
would prefer to continue to exclude disabled workers,'94however,
the framing of disability-based exclusion as a moral wrong can
convince those individual employers not to exercise that preference in fear of social condemnation.This is true whether the censure
arisesthroughformal or informalchannels.
Moreover, in combinationwith either or both of the previous two
orders of sanction, the ADA can cause other members of an employer's society to bear social pressureand condemnationupon them
until they abstain from excluding disabled workers. Again, this is
true especially due to the exclusion of employees with disabilities
not motivated by animus.'19
C. Financial Sanctions:Increasingthe Utility Cost of Discrimination
Finally, the ADA has a belief change effect for the traditional
("Old Chicago") reason that it creates monetary sanctions for discriminating against individuals with disabilities in the workplace.196
See generally Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Eco193
nomic Analysisof InternalizedNorms,86 Va. L. Rev. 1577,1600 (2000) (arguingthat
"[f]orcitizenswho intrinsicallyvalue obeyingthe law... the enactmentof the law increasestheirwillingnessto do theirduty").
'94This argumentworksregardlessof whetherthe underlyingreasonis motivatedby
overtprejudice,benignpaternalism,or ignoranceof true cost.
195

See supra Section III.B.

196

42 U.S.C. ?? 2000e-5(g),12117(2000).
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the ADA
Modeled after Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,197
of
tracks
its
and
offers
several
means
consciously
many
provisions
for prosecuting claims.98These include the requirement that employers engage in an "interactive process" with disabled workers
requesting those workplace alterations,99the formal filing of a disability discrimination complaint with a local Equal Employment
Opportunities Commission ("EEOC") office,200the request for
and lawsuits brought against those employers either
mediation,201
by aggrieved individuals or by the EEOC or Department of Justice
Each of these measures in turn carries insuing on their behalf.202
creasingly heavy transaction costs for employers. Thus, regardless
of whether employers continue to ultimately prove victorious in
the ADA has added a transaction
defending federal court suits,203
cost that reduces the overall utility to individual employers of exercising a preference for excluding disabled workers. Accordingly, by
providing sanctions, the ADA motivates individual employers to
reconsider acting on preferences that exclude disabled individuals
from employment.
CONCLUSION

By utilizing a qualitative metric, Rights of Inclusion makes a
valuable contribution to the literature examining the post-ADA effects on workers and others with disabilities. As noted above, the
currently utilized gauge directly links the ADA's efficacy to aggreCivil Rights Act of 1964 ? 703, 42 U.S.C. ? 2000(e)-2(a) (2000) (prohibiting employment practices that result in disparate treatment as well as those causing disparate impact).
198
See S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 43 (1989); H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 82-83
(1990).
199
29 C.F.R. ?? 1630.2(o)(3), 1630.9 (2003). See generally Amy Renee Brown, Note,
Mental Disabilities Under the ADA: The Role of Employees and Employers in the
Interactive Process, 8 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol'y 341, 352-68 (2002) (describing judicial
interpretations of the interactive process); Comment, Determining Reasonable Accommodations Under the ADA: Why Courts Should Require Employers to Participate in an "Interactive Process," 30 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 513, 542-45 (1999) (describing
components for an "optimal interactive process").
20042 U.S.C. ? 2000(e)(5) (2000); 29 C.F.R. ?? 1601.6-.8 (2003) (establishing the
for this process).
guidelines
201
42 U.S.C. ? 12212 (2000).
202
Id. ? 12117.
197

203

See supraIntroduction.
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gate employment rate levels.20This provides a serviceable understanding of post-ADA effects, and raises disquieting and worthwhile questions,205but only from an external, and essentially
anonymous, perspective. By emphasizing the recursive nature of
rights identity formation, Engel and Munger lend insight and nuance into how the ADA affects the lives of the individuals it was
meant to assist. For disability rights advocates, this is a useful point
of view, especially at a time when the ADA is considered besieged.26
Nevertheless, because the authors' thesis is heavily dependent
on internal and conceptualized notions of self-empowerment,
Rights of Inclusion tends to downplay the external stimuli that also
This absence is noteworthy for three reagenerate rights identity.207
sons. First, it is counter-factual to several of the disability life stories portrayed in the book. The respective employers of both Bill
and Sara Lane,09for instance, each provided accommodaMeier208
tions sua sponte after the passage of the ADA.
Second, by focusing on the internal nature of recursive rights
identity formation to the exclusion of external generation, Rights
of Inclusion falls prey to the theoretical flaw that it asserts exists in
204

See supraIntroduction.
See Stein, supranote 16, at 1684-90.
206Forinstance, the assertion of a backlashagainst disabilityrights was explored
from a numberof differentangles in MartaRussell,Backlash,the PoliticalEconomy,
and StructuralExclusion,21 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 335, 336 (2000) (averring
"thatthe backlashto the ADA has been promptedby capitalistopposition").Russell
assertsthat this "capitalistopposition"has "promotedthe backlashamonggroupsof
workerswho have become fearfulthat their own interestsare in jeopardyas a result
of the Act's enforcementpowers."Id. ProfessorStephen Percyhas noted that critics
of the ADA have characterizedthe Act as an unacceptable"instanceof expansive
regulatorymandateson the privatesector."StephenL. Percy,AdministrativeRemedies and Legal Disputes:Evidenceon Key ControversiesUnderlyingImplementation
of the AmericansWith Disabilities Act, 21 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 413, 433
(2000).
207The authorsdo acknowledgethe influenceof exogenous factorssuch as employers actingon their own initiative,but do not adequatelydevelop this theoryin Rights
of Inclusionon those actions.They do, however, elaboratethis notion in an earlier
work.See David M. Engel & FrankW. Munger,Re-Interpretingthe Effect of Rights:
CareerNarrativesand the Americanswith DisabilitiesAct, 62 Ohio St. L.J. 285, 329
(2001).
208 Bill was allowed to more-or-lessself-createa job at which he is very successful.
Engel & Munger,supranote 15, at 200-01.
Sarawas providedwith a closed-offworkspace.Id. at 26-27.
205
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critical rights jurisprudence.210
Namely, that if disabled workers
(and, to make the point stronger, their employers) believe that the
ADA is a powerful tool when it really is not, then those ADA
rights are deceptive and ultimately illusory.
Third, and this factor is crucial to an expressive law analysis, although the identity formation of rights bearers is an important factor (and Engel and Munger are to be praised for so staunchly advocating this perspective), so is the change in general social norms.
Because these are measured from the perspective of the belief
change engendered in the actions of potential discriminators,it is
best seen from not only an internal view, but from an external expressive law perspective as well.

210See supra Section I.C.

